After enumerating all the application menus, it became apparent, that there is no potential to run CL commands. The first task was trying to break out of the initial program limitation. While the default menu allows access to the Command Language (CL) prompt (the “shell”), this can be replaced by configuring custom initial programs for users, that provide only limited features, such as executing predefined database queries. However, instead of providing raw shell access, TN5250 usually displays menu-based user interfaces (the “green screen”). Native programs of IBM i are commonly accessed remotely on a telnet-like protocol, called TN5250. The user had an initial program configured after logging in on TLS wrapped TN5250, so direct CL command execution was not possible. The presented techniques stem from misconfigurations common on this platform – this post only covers one privilege escalation path, but the comprehensive configuration audit of the same system uncovered several local and even remote vulnerabilities.įor the penetration testing the Client provided network access to the machine in the internal network, one low-level user account with special authority *NONE and limit capabilities value set to *PARTIAL. This blog post is the first step of publishing our findings to the security community, where I would like to share a walkthrough of the penetration testing result of an IBM i system.
Recognizing, that these systems are here to stay, and that information critical to understanding their security architecture is scarce and sometimes inaccurate, we decided to create our own IBM i lab, that allowed us to familiarize ourselves with these systems, create new methodologies and tools to assess their security, and even to identify previously unknown vulnerabilities in them. – The compiler is tightly coupled with the OS, which, besides hardware independence also supports implementing memory safety checks at compile time even for languages like C – A database engine is integrated into the operating system, so you can have an SQL view of practically any component of the system – Thanks to complete ISA abstraction, programs can be executed unmodified even when the hardware architecture changes – It is an object-oriented operating system, where object types determine what operations on a piece of data can be performed Some properties, that differentiate IBM i from your average server platform:
More info about LGPL version 2.1 can be found at.
Tn5250 hex attributes software#
This software uses the ZBar Bar Code Reader project licensed under the LGPL 2.1 license. support barcode scan as input data, format including: EAN-13/UPC-A, UPC-E, EAN-8, Code 128, Code 93, Code 39, Interleaved 2 of 5, DataBar, DataBar Expanded and QR Code Pop-up and non-overlapping virtual terminal keyboard and function key support quick-access function key and defined over the cloud support user-defined Chinese characters over the cloud support input and display Chinese characters TN5250 communication to host (Not normal telnet protocol) ATC TN5250 emulates IBM Chinese 5250 terminals and uses TN5250 protocol for communication with the host systems.ĪTC brings you a high quality and proven emulator for your iPad, iPhone, iPod touch devices. ATC TN5250 for iPad/iPhone/iPod touch is the first Chinese 5250 terminal emulation program in the world.ĪTC TN5250 is used to access applications running on IBM iSeries systems, also known as AS400 systems.
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